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Safety First and Ambiguity 
Lawrence A. Berger* and Howard Kunreuthert 
Abstract 
There is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that ambiguity (i.e., pa-
rameter risk) impacts pricing decisions by actuaries and underwriters and their 
desire to provide coverage. Stone proposed a safety first model of choice that 
provides a possible explanation for this behavior. This paper analyzes Stone's 
proposed stability and survival constraints and compares the results with those 
predicted by expected utility theory. The analysis is motivated by insurers' in-
creaSing reluctance to provide coverage for certain specific risks such as earth-
quake damage insurance where the probability of loss is ambiguous. We show 
that such behavior is consistent with safety first but is difficult to explain using 
an expected utility approach. 
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1 Introduction 
Stone (l973a, 1973b) put forward a behavioral theory of insurance 
capacity in the spirit of a chance constrained/safety first model of 
choice that still stands as a possible explanation for crises of availabil-
ity in insurance markets. Stone proposes that constraints of stability 
and survival are used by insurance companies for acceptance or rejec-
tion of risks, where stability means regularity in corporate profits over 
time, and survival refers to the specification of a maximum probability 
that aggregate losses exceed surplus. 
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a more formal analysis of 
these constraints and to compare the results to the predictions of ex-
pected utility theory. Short-run supply functions are derived that deter-
mine the lowest price that a firm will charge to protect a certain number 
of risks against a particular event or, equivalently, how many risks the 
firm will insure at a given price. The actual price that is observed will 
reflect the demand for insurance. Our focus is on the first steps that 
firms are likely to take before entering the marketplace. 
In his analysis of insurer behavior Stone suggests that "second de-
gree uncertainty" (also termed ambiguity) influences decisions on price 
as well as whether a firm will want to offer coverage. Stone does not 
specify how ambiguity would be incorporated in his model of choice, 
however. In the last few years a literature on ambiguity has arisen 
that addresses the issue of economic behavior when there is uncer-
tainty over the parameters of probability distributions (Kunreuther, 
1989; Kunreuther, Hogarth, and Meszaros 1993). 
Of interest to us is the impact of ambiguity on the premium charged 
by the firm and its desire to prm'ide coverage. Our analysis is motivated 
by insurers' recent difficulties in providing coverage for specific risks 
where the probability of a loss is ambiguous. For example, today in-
surers are reluctant to provide coverage to homeowners against earth-
quakes because of a concern that the losses from a catastrophic disaster 
could create capacity problems and possibly cause insolvency. Hence, 
the indllstry has argued for some type of federal earthquake insurance 
program just as they did for flood coverage in the 1960s; for more on 
this, see the Insurance Services Office (1994). As we shall demonstrate, 
this lack of interest by private firms in providing protection is consis-
tent with a safety first model of firm behavior, but is difficult to explain 
using an expected utility approach. 
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2 Safety First and Utility Theory 
Suppose that an insurer is interested in offering one-period cover-
age for a group of n mutually independent risks. At the end of the 
period, each risk is assumed to have a probability e of causing a loss of 
fixed amount fl. (At this point e is assumed to be a known constant. I 
In Section 3, however, we will consider the case where e is a random 
variable.) The insurer's current surplus on hand, w, is assumed to be 
known with certainty. In addition, the insurer is assumed to be risk 
averse with a known continuous concave utility function. 
Under traditional von Neumann-Morgenstern2 expected utility pric-
ing, the premium is set so the insurer is indifferent between taking the 
risk or not. The pricing relation is given by 
where: 
u(W) = E[uCw + nIT - X)] 
u(·) The insurer's utility function; 
IT The insurance premium per risk; and 
X Aggregate losses for the n risks 
Kxfl 
where K is the actual number of losses. 
(1) 
Under Stone's model of safety first behavior, the premium is deter-
mined by constraints of stability and solvency. Expenses are ignored in 
the analysis that follows. Stability requires a probability less than PI 
that the loss ratio exceeds a certain target level r*. Specifically, if there 
are n risks, the premium ITs required to satisfy the stability constraint 
is given by 
Kfl Pr[-- > r*] < PI, 
nITs 
(2) 
'Throughout this paper, random variables are denoted by uppercase English or 
Greek letters. 
2Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) developed expected utility theory for use 
when there is a process of decision making under uncertainty. Expected utility theory 
has been used by actuaries since the 1960s; see, for example, Borch (1968). There are 
many problems associated with expected utility theory, however, such as (i) the lack 
of a unique utility function, (ii) the utility function, even if unique, may be unknown, 
and (iii) the utility function may be concave in some areas and convex in other areas. 
See, for example, Ramsay (1993, Section 3.2) for more on the problems associated with 
expected utility theory. 
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where K is the actual number of losses. Clearly K is binomially dis-
tributed with parameters nand e, i.e., 
(3) 
The survival constraint relates aggregate losses for the risk in ques-
tion to the current surplus plus premiums written. It requires that the 
probability of insolvency be less than P2. The premium ITr required to 
satisfy the survival constraint is given by: 
Pr[Kf> w + nIT,-] < P2. (4) 
Because the safety first constraints do not always provide a defini-
tive premium, it is necessary to include a profit criterion as part of a 
pricing model. Stone indicates that insurers often specify a fixed profit 
margin in making their pricing decisions. Let m represent the profit 
margin for a given risk. If one uses the expected value of losses as a 
reference point, then the profit criterion for any given risk would yield 
premium ITe (ignoring expenses) given by: 
ITe = eP(l + m). 
Of course, the premium may be higher than that implied by the profit 
criterion because of the stability and solvency constraints. 
The expected profit criterion coupled with the safety first constraints 
form a supply function for insurance that relates required premiums to 
the number of poliCies written. Figure 1 illustrates the prices required 
under the safety first constraints. Here e = 0.10, m = 0.10,& = 1, and 
r* = l.0, and the survival constraint is graphed for w = 0, 5, and 10. 
The safety first probabilities are, respectively, Pi = 0.05, P2 = 0.0000l. 
It is evident from Figure 1 that the magnitude of w is only important for 
smaller values of n. For very small values of n (and for w greater than 
zero) premiums will be determined by the stability constraint because 
a relatively high premium is needed for the loss ratio to be less than 
one with the required probability. 
Figure 2 shows the supply function that results from the safety first 
constraints with w = 10 that are graphed in Figure l. This supply 
function is generated from three curves shown in Figure 1: (i) Stability, 
(ii) Survival (w = 10), and (iii) Profit Objective. SpeCifically, the supply 
function is determined as follows: For each value of n, 
IT = max {Stability, Survival, Profit Objective}. 
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For the supply function n, the number of risks insured, is the quantity 
supplied, and IT is the price per unit risk. 
The supply function can be compared with that implied when the in-
surer sets premiums on the basis of expected utility. For an exponential 
utility function 
equation (1) implies 
1 = ± e-A(nrr-k) (n)8 k(1 _ 8)n-k. 
k~O k 
Solving for IT yields 
1 
IT = -In(l + 8(e'\ - 1)) 
i\ 
(5) 
so that IT is independent of nand w. This property of exponential util-
ity pricing, known as additivity, is desirable because the order in which 
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Figure 2 
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independent risks are taken do not affect the price of each risk. 3 This 
property does not hold for logarithmic and quadratic utility functions. 
We will show in the next section that for logarithmic and quadratic 
utility functions, the premiums are practically constant, increasing very 
slowly as n increases. Premiums will increase substantially with n un-
der all of these utility functions, however, when there is ambiguity in 
the probability distribution associated with lusses. 
3 Ambiguity and Insurance Pricing 
The literature on credibility theory provides the foundation for mod-
eling the impact on premiums if there is ambiguity with respect to 
the parameters of probability distributions; see, for example, Heilmann 
3It is well-known that exponential utility yields premiums that are independent of 
nand 1'1'; see Gerber (1979, Chapter 5). 
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(1989) and Venter (1990) for more on credibility theory. Given the na-
ture of credibility theory, it has been long recognized that Bayesian 
techniques can be utilized to replace the ad hoc formulae that actu-
aries have been using for pricing (Mayerson, 1964). Klugman (1992) 
gives an excellent treatment of the application of Bayesian techniques 
to credibility theory. Although research is being conducted on expected 
utility premium principles (Goovaerts and Taylor, 1987) and credibility 
theory, little work has been done on expected utility pricing under pa-
rameter uncertainty.4 
In the literature on ambiguity, uncertainty over the parameters of 
probability distributions often is characterized as disagreement among 
experts.s In such situations, however, we may be able to use mixing 
distributionsG for parameters in modeling such uncertainty. A uniform 
distribution, for instance, may depict a situation in which opinion is 
spread evenly over a range of values. A discrete mixing distribution, 
on the other hand, could be used to represent a case where there are 
substantial differences of opinion and the experts have specific values 
for the parameters. We will see that under extreme ambiguity insur-
ers often will be unwilling to provide coverage at any price when they 
are following safety first principles. This will not be the case under 
expected utility pricing. 
It is useful to contrast the concept of ambiguity, as defined in this 
paper, with that of process risk which often is used to characterize un-
certainty. Ambiguity (also called parameter risk) refers to uncertainty in 
the parameters of the probability or outcome distribution, whereas pro-
cess risk refers to the risk associated with the projection of future losses 
which are inherently random. 7 Actuaries often use mixtures of distri-
butions to model situations where parameters vary over a population; 
see Panjer and Willmot (1992, Chapters 2.8 and 8). We are, however, 
applying mixtures in a different way. The distribution of the parameter 
now is used to characterize parameter risk. This approach differs from 
Bayesian analYSis as there is no updating procedure; rather, the focus 
is the degree of uncertainty about the true value of the parameter. 
With ambiguity, e is the uncertain parameter in the speCification of 
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) X, Fe(x). In this case, e is 
4But see Freifelder (1976, 1979). Goovaerts, De Vylder, and Haezendonck (1984) 
study the effect of parameter uncertainty on premium principles such as the Escher, 
but not utility theory. 
sFor example, in asseSSing risks such as underground storage tank, earthquake, and 
satellite, the scientific community is divided due to the lack of data and causal models. 
6The mixing distribution is the probability distribution of the uncertain parameter. 
7This definition of process risk follows McClenahan (1990, page 61). 
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viewed as a random variable with cdf G(8). Throughout the rest of this 
paper, the probability distribution function (pdf) (if e is continuous) or 
probability function (if e is discrete) of e is denoted by 9(8) = dG(8). 
The pricing equation for expected utility theory is 
U(w) Ee[E[u(w + nIT - X)] Ie] 
f:=-oo J:=o u(w + nIT - x)dFo(x) dG(8). (6) 
Because the mean of e is assumed to be a known constant, ambiguity 
will not influence pricing under risk neutrality. 
To contrast the differences between the effect of ambiguity on ex-
pected utility and safety first pricing we consider the same case dis-
cussed above where the firm is assumed to be insuring identical inde-
pendent Bernoulli risks. The premium per risk, IT, as a function of n is 
computed under the following conditions: 
• No ambiguity; 
• The uniform mixing distribution, 
(e) = f 1 for 0 :s; e :s; 1 
91 l 0 otherwise; 
• The discrete mixing distribution, 
, (8) = S 0.5 for e = 0 or 1 
92 l 0 otherwise. 
Note that both 91 (8) and 92(8) yield E[e = 0.5]. 
Under each of the above conditions, we will use the exponential util-
ity function defined in equation (5) and the following utility functions: 
Ul(X) 
uq(x) 
In(201 + x) logarithmic: with x> -201; and (7) 
-(10 - X)2 quadratic: with -00 < x :s; 10. (8) 
Using equation (6), the expressions for the premiums can easily be cal-
culated. 
Table 1 depicts the resulting premiums for these different utility 
functions and mixing distributions. Although the premium for expo-
nential utility remains constant with no ambiguity, the fact that prf'mi-
ums increase as n increases for all of the mixing distributions means 
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that additivity does not hold under parameter uncertainty. The premi-
ums for the logarithmic utility function for the no ambiguity and uni-
form mixing distribution cases are determined by numerical methods. 
As is the case for the exponential utility function, the premium under 
ambiguity increases with 11. and is higher for the discrete than for the 
uniform mixing distribution. The same results hold for the quadratic 
utility function. For the discrete mixing distribution, the premiums are 
higher than under the uniform mixing distribution due to the concen-
tration of mass at probability zero and one. One interpretation of such 
behavior is a split in expert opinion: one group believes an event is cer-
tain to occur, while another group believes it will not. If the event does 
occur, all risks will suffer losses. This kind of extreme ambiguity, such 
as that given by a discrete mixing distribution, thus translates into a 
perfect correlation of risks. 
Table 1 
Premiums for E[8 = 0.5] 
Mixing Distributions 
Utility 11. NAB 91 (8) 92(8) 
Exponential 1 0.6200 0.6200 0.6200 
10 0.6200 0.8060 0.9310 
20 0.6200 0.8710 0.9650 
100 0.6200 0.9580 0.9930 
Logarithmic 1 0.5006 0.5006 0.5006 
10 0.5006 0.5025 0.5062 
20 0.5006 0.5046 0.5124 
100 0.5006 0.5212 0.5613 
Quadratic 1 0.5125 0.51251 0.5125 
10 0.5126 0.5513 0.6340 
20 0.5127 0.6021 1.0000 
100 0.5134 
Note: NAB = No Ambiguity. 
In general, probability uncertainty introduces correlation into port-
folios that otherwise would consist of independent risks if the value 
of 8 were known. The relation between ambiguity and correlation is 
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particularly clear when both the risks and the parameters are normally 
distributed. In this case, if the normal mixing distribution for 8 has 
variance T2 then the correlation between the risks is also T2 (Heilmann, 
1989, p. 81). Thus, parameter uncertainty translates directly into cor-
relation between risks that are conditionally independent. 
Premiums under ambiguity are calculated in Table 2 using exponen-
tial utility and the safety first stability constraint. In each case we use 
three different mixing distributions: 
93(8) { 5 for 0::0; 8 ::0; 0.2 0 otherwise; 
94(8) { 0.5 for 8 = 0 or 0.2 0 otherwise; 
{ 0.9 for 8 = 0 95(8) 0.1 for 8 = 1 0 otherwise. 
For each of these three mixing distributions E[8] = 0.1. 
Table 2 
Premiums for Exponential Utility and Safety First 
Mixing Distributions 
n NAB 93(8) 94(8) 95 (8) 
Exponential 1 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 
10 0.159 0.188 0.231 0.770 
20 0.159 0.211 0.261 0.885 
100 0.159 0.263 0.288 0.977 
Safety First 1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(with stability 10 0.300 0.300 0.400 1.000 
constraint) 20 0.200 0.250 0.300 1.000 
100 0.150 0.210 0.250 1.000 
Note: NAB = No Ambiguity. 
For the exponential utility function defined in equation (5) and no 
ambiguity, the insurer's premium is independent of the number of risks 
and is given by IT = 0.159. Probability ambiguity causes premiums to 
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increase rapidly as 11 increases. For the discrete mixing distribution 
95(8), the premium is as high as 0.977 when 11 = 100. 
For the safety first model the story is completely different, as indi-
cated in Table 2. The premiums required under the stability constraint 
given by equation (2) decline as n increases. In the most extreme case, 
the discrete mixing distribution over [0,1], the constraint never can be 
met because the probability of n losses is 0.10 and we have assumed 
that PI = 0.05 in equation (2). 
Table 3 shows the impact of the survival constraint (given by equa-
tion (4) with pz = 0.00001) on premiums for relatively small values of 
n for the non-ambiguous case and when the probability distribution of 
losses is ambiguous using 93. Consider the non-ambiguous case. In 
order to understand how the firm's surplus and number of poliCies n 
affect TTl', let 
Then for f = 1, 
k(n) = min{k: Pr[K > k] < pz}. 
k(n) w 
TTl' = max{O, -- - -}. 
n n 
(9) 
Thus the insurer's current surplus on hand, w, can be viewed as a mea-
sure of its capacity to accept risks and has its greatest impact for small 
values of n. Insurers with larger capacity are able to charge lower pre-
miums. Note that as n increases (starting from 1), premiums may in-
crease or decrease depending on the behavior of k(n)/n. But, from the 
law of large numbers, k(n)/n goes to £[8] as n goes to infinity. So 
the premium TTl' eventually will approach the expected loss. (See Figure 
1.) Like the stability constraint, the required premiums increase under 
this mixing distribution compared to the non-ambiguous case, but the 
premiums also decline as the number of risks increases. 
Thus a distinction emerges between the predictions of safety first 
and utility theory under ambiguity. With extreme ambiguity, coverage 
will be denied under the safety first criteria, while under more moderate 
conditions premiUms will increase but eventually will decline for large 
11. On the other hand, in utility theory, increased ambiguity results in 
higher premiums and the failure of the law of large numbers to have 
any influence as the number of risks increases. 
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Table 3 
Premiums (TTl') 
Under Survival Constraint 
w n No Ambiguity 93(0) 
0 10 0.60 0.70 
20 0.45 0.55 
50 0.32 0.42 
100 0.25 0.35 
200 0.20 0.30 
5 10 0.10 0.20 
20 0.20 0.30 
50 0.22 0.32 
100 0.20 0.30 
200 0.18 0.28 
10 10 0.00 0.00 
20 0.00 0.05 
50 0.12 0.22 
100 0.15 0.25 
200 0.15 0.25 
20 50 0.00 0.02 
100 0.05 0.15 
200 0.10 0.20 
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4 Empirical Results 
Hogarth and Kunreuther (1990) conducted a survey to test the var-
ious theories of insurance pricing. Actuaries were asked to price war-
ranties on the performance of a component of a new line of microcom-
puters. They were told that the cost of repair is $100, and there can 
be at most one breakdown per period. Experimental variations concern 
the number of units insured, ambiguous and non-ambiguous probabil-
ities of breakdown, and probability levels of 0.001, 0.01, and 0.10. In 
the ambiguous versions of the scenario, respondents were told there 
is considerable disagreement among experts regarding the probability 
of a breakdown of any given unit, while in the non-ambiguous versions 
they were told that the experts all agree on the chances of a breakdown. 
The results are listed in Table 4 in terms of the ratios of the prices 
proposed by the actuaries to the expected losses. It is evident in all 
cases that ambiguity results in higher prices. What is difficult to ex-
plain, however, is that even in the absence of ambiguity, prices increase 
as risks are added for e = 0.001 and e = 0.01 while they decline for 
e = 0.10. Utility theory implies that premiums increase as risks are 
added under decreasing absolute risk aversion, and premiums decline 
under increasing absolute risk aversion (Goovaerts and Taylor, 1987; 
see note 5). The above empirical results seem to suggest that the actu-
aries' utility functions exhibit decreasing and increasing absolute risk 
aversion over the appropriate ranges. 
Table 4 
Actuaries' Price-Expected Loss Ratios for Warranties 
e = 0.001 e = 0.01 e = 0.100 
n= 10,000 
N on -ambiguous 1.266 1.149 1.075 
Ambiguous 2.439 1.587 1.370 
n= 100,000 
Non-ambiguous 1.538 1.176 1.020 
Ambiguous 3.333 1.961 1.316 
Source: Hogarth, R. and Kunreuther, H. "Risk, Ambiguity and Insurance." 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2 (1990): 5-35. 
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It is possible, however, to explain the actuaries' pricing from the 
perspective of safety first theory. We noted earlier that the premiums 
implied by the survival constraint can rise for smaller values of n fol-
lowed by declines. The observed patterns of pricing with no ambiguity 
can be explained if premiums are increasing for 8 = 0.001 and 8 = 0.01 
and decreasing for 8 = 0.10 over the range of n being considered. 
Consider, for example, the results exhibited in Table 5 for w = 15. 
For 8 = 0.001 prices peak at n = 40,000, while for 8 = 0.10 prices 
decline over the entire range of values for n. When n increases from 
10,000 to 100,000, prices thus increase for 8 = 0.001 and decline for 
8 = 0.10. This occurs because the relative magnitude of the initial 
surplus is higher for small values of 8. The capacity goes further for 
smaller values of 8 and, therefore, the premiums rise for larger values 
of n. 
Table 5 
Impact of Survival Constraint on Premiums 
With w = 15 and Non-Ambiguous Risks 
TT TT/8 
n 8 = 0.001 8 = 0.100 8 = 0.001 8 = 0.100 
10,000 O.OOllO 0.lll5 1.10 1.ll5 
20,000 0.00135 0.1084 1.35 1.084 
30,000 0.00137 0.1070 1.37 1.070 
40,000 0.00138 0.1061 1.38 1.061 
50,000 0.00136 0.1055 1.36 1.055 
60,000 0.00135 0.1050 1.35 1.050 
70,000 0.00133 0.1046 1.33 1.046 
80,000 0.00133 0.1044 1.33 1.044 
90,000 0.00131 0.1041 1.31 1.041 
100,000 0.00130 0.1039 1.30 1.039 
The fact that for the survey of actuaries relative prices are higher 
for smaller values of 8 is explained readily in the presence of expenses 
that do not vary with the probability of loss. 
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5 Coverage Limits 
The consideration of ambiguity can shed light on another question 
of interest. The fact that insurance companies offer liability policies 
with specified coverage limits is a puzzle from the perspective of util-
ity theory. Models of risk sharing under expected utility maximization 
invariably conclude that the entire risk should be split according to the 
risk preferences of the parties to the exchange. The optimal contractual 
forms do not include coverage limits but involve deductibles and coin-
surance above some level. Only in the case of a regulatory constraint 
requiring insurers to sell a policy with a prescribed actuarial value has 
it been shown that there will be policy limits (Raviv, 1979). Huberman, 
Mayers, and Smith (1983) derive coverage limits when demand is influ-
enced by limited liability under speCific assumptions about the nature 
of the risk, but this does not explain insurers' reluctance to offer poli-
cies with unlimited exposure. In fact, consideration of limited liability 
of insurers would suggest that they would be more than willing to sell 
such poliCies if there were relatively low costs of bankruptcy. 
The above analysis assumes a fixed loss size of one, but it easily is 
extended to a severity of loss sizee. The survival constraint may be 
written as 
IV Pr[K ~ 7 + nIT] ::s; 0.00001, (10) 
where IT is now the premium per dollar of coverage. Note that capacity 
is now IV II! instead of IV. As I! increases, capacity approaches zero, 
which limits the ability of firms to write small numbers of large risks. 
In this case the supply function with IV = 0 in Figure 1 is an appropriate 
representation of the insurer's ability to provide coverage. 
Large values of I! together with ambiguity further will act to raise 
prices and limit availability. From equations (10) and (9), 
ken) IV 
IT-----, 
- n ne 
(11) 
so for large I! the ratio k(n)ln becomes the key determinant of price. 
In the absence of ambiguity k (n) I n will approach 8 (recall that 8 is 
known) as n gets large. This is generally not the case when ambiguity 
is present. For example, when E[8] = 0.5 
• Under the uniform mixing distribution, the probability of all out-
comes is 1/(n + 1), i.e., 
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Pr[K = k] = r1 (n)ek(l_ e)l1-kde = _1_. Jo k n+1 
Hence the limit of k(n)/n as n ~ 00 is 1; 
• When the ambiguity is characterized by the discrete mixing dis-
tribution over the [0, 1] interval, the probability of n losses is e, 
so unless nil :5 w + nf.IT the survival constraint always will be 
violated for e > 0.00001. Therefore, the law of large numbers is 
ineffective in cases such as these. Hence, only a relatively small 
number of risks m?y be underwritten. 
Contrast these observations with the case of no ambiguity and inde-
pendent risks: for e = 0.1 the number of risks n need only be six for 
the probability of n losses to be less than 0.00001. 
The company has three alternatives in meeting the survival con-
straint under extreme ambiguity-it can reduce n, raise IT, or reduce f. 
Solving the constraint ni!:5 w + nfIT for n, we get n:5 w/((l-IT)-e). 
In general, the constraint on the number of risks will be 
w 
n :5 (k(l1) _ IT)!:" 
n 
With ambiguity, k(n)/n will be close to one for small values of n, so 
the same analysis goes through under these conditions. This means 
that the capacity w relative to the severity f determines how many 
risks can be underwritten. A natural way to increase the number of 
risks that can be underwritten is to reduce f by way of coverage limits. 
Capacity also is increased by increasing IT, but IT cannot get too close 
to one, especially when expenses are considered. When the constraint 
is reached, nf = w + nfIT and the capacity to assume new risks is 
exhausted. In order to assume a new risk, the premium collected must 
be increased 100 cents to the dollars in order to prevent violation of 
the constraint; that is, IT must approach one and the insurance will not 
be purchased. 
We see that ambiguity and safety first results in a focus on the worst 
possible outcome (nf) that a portfolio of risks may suffer. Empiri-
cal studies of managerial behavior in the face of uncertainty suggest 
that managers do tend to focus on the severity of the worst possible 
BSee Kunreuther (1989) for an interview with an actuary who uses this expression 
to explain his reaction to extre-me ambiguity. 
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outcomes, paying less attention to the probability of their occurrence 
(March and Shapira, 1987, p. 1407). Not only does this describe man-
agerial behavior, but such a focus is prescribed by the leading texts on 
risk management (e.g., Williams and Heins, 1989; Vaughan, 1992). Risk 
management procedures call for prioritizing risks according to their 
potential severity followed by an estimation of the probability of their 
occurrence. The ambiguity inherent in many organizational risks calls 
for a managerial focus on potentially catastrophic risks regardless of 
the probability of their occurrence. 
6 Discussion 
The safety first model of insurance pricing has been shown to pro-
vide significantly different predictions from those of expected utility 
theory. While the utility functions (exponential, quadratic and logarith-
mic) examined here exhibit nondecreasing premiums as risks are added 
to the portfolio, under a safety first model premiums may increase or 
decline for small values of n according to the predominance of the sur-
vival or stability constraints. Under safety first, the value of IT declines 
as the number of insured risks becomes relatively large. 
When ambiguity is present, price increases are exaggerated under 
utility theory, whereas for safety first the results depend on the extent 
of the ambiguity. Under extreme ambiguity insurers often will be re-
luctant to provide coverage at any price except dollar-for-dollar, while 
for more moderate ambiguity, premiums will be higher even though 
they eventually may decline. Safety first theory also has been shown 
to yield a definition of capacity as referring to the ability to underwrite 
relatively small numbers of risks and to provide explanations for the ex-
istence of coverage limits in liability insurance. It appears that Stone's 
characterization of insurer behavior has considerable merit. 
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